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Decoupling "Terrorist" from "Immigrant:"
An Enhanced Role for the Federal Courts
Post 9/11
Victor C. Romero*
1. THE LINK BETWEEN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND IMMIGRATION
Immigration law is traditionally understood to encompass the rules that
govern foreign citizens' entry into and departure from the United States, and
may therefore be seen as an important domestic arm of the nation's foreign
policy power. Immigration law is the exclusive purview of the federal
government t While there are times when federal law might have unintended
effects upon noncitizens, 2 as a vehicle for effectuating foreign policy,
immigration law can serve as an effective complement. For example, if the U.S.
declares war on Iraq, it might make sense to exclude all Iraqi citizens from
immigrating to the United States, not just for our own citizens' security, but for
theirs as well.
But what should our immigration laws say when the object of our foreign
policy is not another nation, but a multinational guerrilla movement such as al-
Qaeda? How does the U.S. balance its national security concerns against fair
treatment of the individual noncitizens affected by its immigration laws? Just
last year, Congress passed a law requiring greater scrutiny of visa applications
. Professor of Law, Penn State, The Dickinson School of Law. B.A. Swarthmore; J.D., University of
Southern California. E-mail: VCRI@PSU.EDU. This essay grows out of remarks I gave at the
University of Iowa College of Law for The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice's Symposium,
"American Presence Abroad: U.S. Foreign Policy & Its Implications on Gender, Race & Justice"; I
thank Kevin Sul and Nettie Dennis for inviting me to participate. I would also like to thank Raquel
Aldana-Pindell, Sameer Ashar, and Kevin Johnson for useful advice on an early draft of this piece;
Barbara Brunner for her invaluable research assistance; and most especially, my wife, Corie, my
children, Ryan and Julia, and my family in the Philippines for their constant love and support. All
errors that remain are mine alone.
1. See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (upholding a federal statute regulating
immigration as a constitutional exercise of the foreign commerce clause power). With the recent
passage of federal legislation in the areas of welfare reform and crime that have arguably devolved
some power over alienage to the states, a recent New York University symposium has asked whether
such devolution of immigration power is desirable. See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, Devolution and
Discrimination, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 377 (2002) (analyzing the effect of immigration
devolution on people of color and gays and lesbians).
2. See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, Equal Protection Held Hostage: Ransoming the
Constitutionality of the Hostage Taking Act, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 573 (1997) (arguing that federal
hostage kidnapping statute violates the equal protection rights of noncitizens when invoked in
garden-variety domestic kidnapping cases).
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from nationals of countries that sponsor terrorist activity.3 Clearly, not every
visa applicant from North Korea is a terrorist, and yet it would be imprudent not
to consider North Korea's past practices in ruling upon the application. On the
other hand, is it fair to subject every single person from North Korea to
increased scrutiny in the name of fighting terrorism when we are not (nor will
we likely be) at war with North Korea? And what of North Koreans who might
already be in this country? Should they all be deported, detained and screened
for possible deportation, or interrogated about their links to terrorism?
II. IMMIGRATION AS A TOOL IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM
In what ways may our immigration laws requiring the exclusion or removal
of noncitizens assist in the war on terrorism? Even if technological advances
permitted us to infallibly determine whether a noncitizen was a terrorist or not,
would immigration law be used to either exclude that individual at the border or
remove her from the country? In close cases, the answer is probably "no." On
the one hand, ridding the nation of a dangerous individual prevents her from
directly threatening the country; on the other, deporting the terrorist means she
is still at large, allowing her to strike another day either directly (by entering
without authorization across the border) or indirectly (by abetting a plan to be
carried out by stateside associates). Indeed, our government is even willing to go
beyond our borders to capture alleged terrorists who were never subject to our
immigration controls in the first place. The government's obsession with
capturing Osama bin Laden, as well as the recent slew of arrests of alleged al-
Qaeda henchmen in Singapore4 and Pakistan,5 are examples of the lengths to
which the government will strive to secure peace. In perhaps a less well-known
example, the Washington Post reported that last year the government had
interrogated a noncitizen who was discovered to be an al-Qaeda operative long
3. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, §
306(a), 116 Stat. 543, 555, provides in pertinent part:
No nonimmigrant visa under Section ll(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. I 101(a)(15)) shall be issued to any alien from a country that is a state
sponsor of international terrorism unless the Secretary of State determines, in
consultation with the Attorney General and the heads of other appropriate United
States agencies, that such alien does not pose a threat to the safety or national security
of the United States. In making a determination under this sub-section, the Secretary of
State shall apply standards developed by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Attorney General and the heads of other appropriate United States agencies, that are
applicable to the nationals of such states.
The State Department requires that citizens of North Korea, Cuba, Syria, Sudan, Iran, Iraq, and
Libya who are at least 16 years old must fill out extra forms and appear for interviews before a U.S.
consular officer. BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U. S. DEP'T OF STATE, NOTICE, available at
http://www.travel.state.gov/section306.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2003).
4. Ellen Nakashima & Allan Sipress, Singapore Announces Arrest of 21 Militants, WASH.
POST, Sept. 17, 2002, at A 14.
5. Michael Elliot, Reeling Them In, TIME, Sept. 23, 2002, at 35.
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after he had left the United States.6 Thus, as a theoretical matter, if the
government discovers a particularly dangerous terrorist among the noncitizens it
is investigating, it will likely invoke its criminal laws to prosecute the person for
treason or subversion, rather than its immigration powers to deport or exclude.
Why, then, has Attorney General Ashcroft used immigration proceedings to
seek out terrorists? Following the September 11 attacks, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) arrested and detained approximately one thousand
mostly Arab and Muslim noncitizens for immigration code violations in an
effort to uncover possible terrorists among them.7 Notwithstanding the
questionable desirability of deporting a known terrorist, using immigration
rather than criminal proceedings to screen persons makes sense from the
government's perspective. First, the process gives the government the most
number of remedial options: if it decides a noncitizen is not a terrorist, it can
deport her; if she is a terrorist, it can charge her criminally. In addition, the
government is able to take advantage of the administrative and civil nature of
immigration proceedings to aggressively prosecute its claims without providing
as much due process protection to the individuals charged. 8 For example,
because attorneys are not automatically provided to noncitizens in deportation
proceedings,9 the government is at a distinct advantage in investigating possible
6. Assoc. Press, Deported Man Said to Have Al Qaeda Tie, WASH. POST, Aug. I1, 2002, at
A19. An even more depressing example is that Mohammed Atta, one of the key 9/I1 hijackers, was
arrested for a traffic violation in Florida in July 2001; he was released when officials did not uncover
a prior warrant for his arrest from a neighboring county. Charlie Weaver & Robert Ulrich, Mr.
Magoo v. The Terrorists, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2002, at A 17, available at 2002 WL 2915511 ("The
simple, horrible truth is this: Atta wasn't detained because the CIA, FBI, INS and Florida law-
enforcement agencies didn't have the technology to share information. They still don't.").
7. See Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 331
(2002).
8. Under the plenary power doctrine, Congress is generally immune from judicial oversight
even with respect to procedural due process claims. See, e.g.. United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) ("Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is
due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) ("Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens
as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely
immune from judicial control."). I have argued elsewhere that, assuming the doctrine's continued
resilience, it might behoove the growing Asian and Latino/a communities of color to build coalitions
with other like-minded groups to seek more favorable immigration legislation. See Victor C.
Romero, On Elitin and Aliens: A Political Solution to the Plenary Power Problem, 4 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 343 (2000-01). See also Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and hInnigration:
Challenges for the Latino Community in the Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42 (1995)
(making a similar case with respect to the Latino community).
9. Counsel at removal hearings appear '.'at no expense to the Government." INA §§
240(b)(4)(A), 292; 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1229a(b)(4)(A), 1362 (West 2002). Moreover, although there is no
Sixth Amendment right to counsel at removal hearings (because they are not criminal proceedings),
Fifth Amendment due process limitations do apply. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 663-64 (3d ed. 2002). Federal courts are understandably reluctant to
find Fifth Amendment violations absent truly egregious conduct in specific cases, a standard
common within constitutional immigration law. See, e.g., Reno v. Arab-American Anti-
Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) ("To resolve the present controversy, we need
not rule out the possibility of a rare case in which the alleged basis of discrimination is so outrageous
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terrorist links in the context of deportation than if it had to proceed in a criminal
court. Second, given its limited resources and the similar profiles of the 9/11
bombers (all young, male Middle Eastern nationals 0 ), focusing government
efforts on immigration violators provides it with a legitimate method for killing
two birds with one stone: the government is able to enforce our immigration
laws while simultaneously enhancing our national security (or at least
attempting to do so"'). Third, the government implicitly knows that by targeting
immigration violators only, 12 it likely has the support of the majority of the
public still grieving after 9/11 3 and the backing of constitutional immigration
law, which has left decisions regarding the ingress and egress of noncitizens to
the political branches.'
4
Ill. OVERRELIANCE ON IMMIGRATION POWER UNDERESTIMATES CITIZEN
THREATS WHILE HEIGHTENING MARGINALIZATION OF OUTSIDERS
Despite the arguable efficiency of the Ashcroft plan, there are similarly
that the foregoing considerations can be overcome.").
10. Aside from the executive branch's decision to detain Arab and Muslim noncitizens, it has
also developed anti-terrorism immigration strategies based on age and gender. The Bureau of
Consular Affairs now requires all noncitizen men between the ages of sixteen and forty-five to file a
supplementary visa application, yet another measure that is broadly over- and under-inclusive, as
Israel's experience with suicide bombers of all ages and genders illustrates. See BUREAU OF
CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FACT SHEET: INITIATIVES BY THE BUREAU OF
CONSULAR AFFAIRS TO ENHANCE NATIONAL SECURITY (Sept. 5, 2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/coalition/cr/fs/13316.htm.
11. A recent N.Y.Times/CBS News poll revealed that, since the 9/I1 attacks, many are
skeptical of the government's anti-terrorism efforts and their effectivity. See Adam Clymer & Janet
Elder, Poll Finds Unease on Terror Fight and Concerns About War on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2002, at AI ("Americans increasingly doubt that their government has done enough to protect them
against terrorist attacks .. "). Some polled, like Mary Wool, believe that enhanced security at
airports, for instance, is "just harassment and to make people think they are doing something." Id.
12. As widely reported in the press, for a time, Ashcroft wanted broader powers of
investigation generally, hoping that Congress would provide such authorization in the USA
PATRIOT Act. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau et al., After the Attack, Security Clampdown, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 2001, at A9, available at 2001 WL 2518723. While not a paragon of restraint, the resulting
legislation is certainly less draconian. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001).
13. In the N.Y. Times poll cited supra note 11, two-fifths of the respondents believed that
the government had not done enough since 9/11 to protect them against another terrorist attack; one
of those polled suggested initiating "things like background checks on people who go in and out of
the country" as a means by which such additional security could be achieved. Clymer & Elder, supra
note 1I, at Al.
14. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, 189
U.S. 86 (1903); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) ("[Olver no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over [the admission
of aliens]."). See also cites supra note 8. This use of immigration law to effectuate ideological
exclusion is also not new. Following worker strikes in 1916 and 1917, Congress used immigration
law to weaken the influence of the Industrial Workers of the World, a labor organization critical of
capitalism. By the 1940s and 1950s, the "red scare" had reached epidemic proportions, extending the
government's investigations to alleged citizen dissidents. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 953, 995-97 (2002).
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strong reasons to be skeptical about immigration law's ultimate effectivity as an
anti-terrorist device. Assuming political support remains high, once Ashcroft is
done focusing on Arab and Muslim immigration violators, he may set his sights
on other high priority deportees such as aggravated felons, and so on down the
government's list. Even if the government was able to rid the nation of all
immigration violators, it might do so at the risk of not as actively combating
citizen terrorism because of the added constitutional and criminal law safeguards
afforded U.S. nationals. John Walker Lindh ("the American Taliban") and Jose
Padilla ("the Dirty Bomber") are but two examples of alleged U.S. citizen
terrorists. While these two have received much press, 15 little is known in the
general public about the government's efforts to investigate U.S. citizen terrorist
cells, except perhaps for the hounding of Dr. Steven Hatfill in connection with
last year's anthrax attacks.' 6  In contrast, the continued detention and
investigation of immigration violators for possible terrorist links has received
unending press coverage over the past year. 17 Moreover, one should not
underestimate the emotional, economic, and psychological toll placed on anyone
subject to intense government scrutiny, especially upon persons like immigrants
who, by law, already receive fewer statutory and constitutional protections than
U.S. citizens.
In response, the government might argue that its efforts, despite their
sometimes great costs to individual noncitizens, inure to the benefit of the
15. John Walker Lindh and Jose Padilla were Time.com's "Person of the Week," for example,
on Jan. 25, 2002 and June 14, 2002, respectively. A scan of CBSnews.com revealed that as of Oct.
17, 2002, that service alone had reported eighty-eight times on John Walker Lindh and twenty-two
times on Jose Padilla. For more on Lindh, see John Riley, Lindh Admits Guilt, NEWSDAY (New York
City), July 16, 2002, at A03, available at 2002 WL 2753747; Michael Hedges, Lindh Faces Court,
Hous. CHRON., Jan. 25, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL 3237490. For more on Padilla, see
Amanda Ripley, The Case of the Dirty Bomber, TIME, June 24, 2002, at 28, 29-32 (describing Jose
Padilla's transformation from Chicago street gang member to AI-Qaeda operative); Walter Pincus,
WASH. POST, Captive's Clues Foiled Plot, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 12, 2002, at 1, 4; Caroline
Daniel & Jeremy Grant, Ex-Gang Member Who Went Unnoticed, FIN. TIMES (London), June 11,
2002, at 11, available at 2002 WL 21714781; David G. Savage, Detention of A Citizen Questioned
Law: 'Dirty' Bomb Suspect Was Secretly Held and Hasn't Been Charged, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 2002,
at AI, available at 2002 WL 2482660. This is not to suggest that the two are in fact terrorists. While
Lindh has plead guilty to terrorist activity, Padilla's lawyers are still fighting his designation as an
enemy combatant. Compare Riley with Savage, supra.
16. See, e.g., Ron Kampeas, Anthrax Probe Figure to Undergo Blood Test, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2002, at 5, available at 2002 WL 6470061; Susan Schmidt, Evidence Lacking as Probe of
Scientist in Anthrax Scare Intensifies, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2002, at A07, available at 2002 WL
24827825; Curt Anderson, Justice Dept. Denies Casting Suspicion on Germ Researcher, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 13, 2002, at A51, available at 2002 WL 101988628. Indeed, the government's
aggressive investigation of Hatfill suggests that, had it more resources and were it not necessary to
provide more criminal due process, perhaps it would treat just as seriously perceived national
security threats by U.S. citizens as it would those by noncitizens. Ashcroft's lobbying Congress for
broader investigatory powers immediately after 9/11 supports this view. See supra note 12.
17. Of course, this unequal press coverage might be more a reflection of the press's priorities
than existing reality. See supra text accompanying note 15 (arguing inordinate amount of attention
paid to Lindh and Padilla when general media coverage of domestic U.S. citizen terrorism receives
little press coverage as compared to investigations of noncitizens). But while it is possible that the
government is pursuing with equal fervor the investigation of U.S. citizen-based terrorism, 1, for one,
am skeptical that this is actually happening.
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country writ large. The sacrifice of the few is worth the well-being of the many.
Of course, this argument would be more persuasive if the government could
show definitively that the terms "terrorist" and "immigration violator" are
synonymous, or that there is a sufficiently high correlation between the two. As
the Lindh and Padilla cases remind us, the government's case is based, at best,
on educated guesses and statistical probabilities, and at worst, on stereotypical
presumptions. 8
On the latter point, Ashcroft's Arab-Muslim immigration dragnet
exacerbates racial, religious, and gender stereotypes. As many have
documented, exclusively targeting certain groups, even among noncitizens, is
unacceptably both over- and under-inclusive. 19 Targeting certain groups is
overinclusive because interrogating and detaining thousands of noncitizens
based on accidents of birth offends our notions of liberal equality and individual
civil rights. It is also underinclusive because, as mentioned before, there are U.S.
citizens and other foreign nationals who may also be terrorist threats. 20
IV. PRESERVING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE WAR AGAINST IMMIGRANT
TERRORISM: AN IMPORTANT ROLE FOR THE COURTS
As a final rejoinder, the government might respond that in enacting and
enforcing general immigration policy, it has no choice but to paint wide brush
strokes. Congressional statutes are inherently broad so as to be of sufficiently
general applicability. Executive enforcement strategies are equally so in order to
provide sufficient flexibility to personnel. Indeed, our constitutional immigration
law sanctions such extensive power, understanding that the political branches
have the institutional competence to best engage in foreign relations, to which
18. See supra note 15.
19. See generally Akram & Johnson, supra note 7; Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist,
49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002); Sameer Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The
Consequences of Racial Profiling After September 11, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1185 (2002); Victor C.
Romero, Proxies for Loyalty in Constitutional Immigration Law: Citizenship and Race After
September I1, DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2003); Cole, supra note 14.
20. The USA Patriot Act has also been used to cut off funding sources for terrorism
organizations. See, e.g.. Cosmo Macero, Jr., Anti-Terror Inc. Sets Up Shop in Boston, BOSTON
HERALD, May 6, 2002, at 021, available at 2002 WL 4075268 ('We have to ... thwart potential
terrorist activity any way we can,' U.S. Attorney Michael Sullivan said after the verdict was returned
- marking the first conviction nationwide under the 6-month-old Patriot Act. 'One way is to disrupt
the flow of money to terrorist organizations."'); see also Cole, supra note 14, at 1002 (noting that
pursuant to the USA Patriot Act, the federal government has aggressively investigated two U.S.-
based holding companies for their alleged financial support of terrorism). Similarly, the government
should not neglect domestic terrorism networks such as hate groups that have financial links to anti-
immigration organizations. The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), for example, has traced the
funding of several anti-immigration groups, some of which have been designated by the SPLC as
hate groups, to Dr. John Tanton, a Michigan physician. See Southern Poverty Law Center, The
Puppeteer, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Summer 2002, at 44-51 ("The organized anti-immigration
,movement,' increasingly in bed with racist hate groups, is dominated by one man.") available at
http:/ww'v.splcenter.org/intelligenceprject/ip-indexhtml.
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immigration law is linked through its regulation of migrants. Moreover, there
are no significant signs that the public is willing to shelve immigration policy as
a weapon in the war against terrorism, and thus we cannot expect that the
political branches 22 will either. And perhaps that is as it should be. Our national
policies, for better or worse, are determined by our representative government,
duly elected by our voting public, and in theory, they try to capture majoritarian
sentiment. If, despite the apparent flaws in implementation, most of the public
feels comfortable using immigration law to combat terrorism, then our
republican democracy should support that.
More interestingly, the support for Ashcroft's anti-immigrant, profile-
charged dragnet may have a broader base than simply among middle-class white
American voters. While most post-1965 immigration has come from Asia and
Latin America, and while racial profiling has been roundly denounced by many
in the African- and Latino/a-American communities, immigration policy has
long been a contested playing field. Thus, it may very well be that the much
touted demographic "browning" of America may not lead to better treatment of
noncitizens, especially post-9/l 1, for a number of reasons. First, Professor
Angela Dillard has documented the growth of a multicultural conservative
movement23 exemplified most visibly perhaps by several of Bush's key cabinet
members-Colin Powell (Secretary of State), Condoleeza Rice (National Security
Adviser), and Norman Mineta (Secretary of Transportation)-that might, at the
margin, be more sympathetic to national security concerns linked to restricting
immigration than to more traditional egalitarian principles. Second, both lawful
and undocumented immigration will likely continue to be wedge issues among
and within communities of color. Many African Americans oppose even lawful
immigration on the grounds that it affects native blacks' employment
prospects, 24while recent immigrants from Asia and Latin America are often
21. See supra note 8.
22. Note, however, that the political branches have not completely abdicated leadership in
protecting immigrant rights even post-9/1 1. For example, realizing that the Patriot Act's implicit
prohibition against foreign students enrolling in part-time classes would have had a devastating
effect upon part-time commuter residents along the Canadian and Mexican border, Congress passed
the Border Commuter Student Act, Pub. L. 107-274, 116 Stat. 1923 (2002), which creates a new
class of nonimmigrant visas for such students.
23. See generally ANGELA DILLARD, GUE1SS WHO'S COMING TO DINNER Now?
MULTICULTURAL CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA (2001) (describing the rise of the multicultural
conservative movement).
24. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Hierarchy, Asian Americans, and Latinos as
"Foreigners," and Social Change: Is Law The Way to Go?, 76 OR. L. REV. 347, 359-60 (1997).
In more modem times, African Americans, fearing that immigration adversely impacts
their community by driving down wages, supported restrictionist immigration laws and
policies that have disproportionate impacts on immigration from Asia and Latin
America. In addition, conflict between Blacks and Asians in South Central Los
Angeles and between Blacks and Latinos in other parts of the country have provided
fuel to calls for immigration restriction. (internal citations omitted).
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unsympathetic to civil rights claims by undocumented immigrants25 (hence the
popularity of California's Proposition 187 eliminating many public benefits for
undocumented persons during the early 1990s). Following 9/11, Time magazine
reported undocumented Mexican laborers upset at the enhanced border security
wrought by the terrorist attacks, blaming the situation on the "damn Arabs."
26
Thus, Ashcroft will find some unlikely allies even among citizens and
immigrants of color.
While the likelihood that vigilant immigration enforcement will continue to
be the majority's will, our country also subscribes to an equality principle
designed to protect the least powerful among us. The under-policing of U.S.
citizen terrorists, and the perpetuation of invidious stereotypes evident in our
current immigration policy, undermines equality in two ways. First, because
immigration law is premised on the unequal status of U.S. citizens and
noncitizens, broad policies that apply only to noncitizens, even those enacted in
the name of national security, are likely to widen the citizen-noncitizen divide
and enhance tensions between the two groups. 27 Second, to the extent that most
U.S. immigrants today are people of color from Asia and Latin America, the
unintended burden of stringent immigration enforcement will fall upon racial
outsiders, exacerbating tensions between whites and nonwhites. 28
Fortunately, there is an integral institution in our democracy designed and
particularly well-suited to protect individual claimants-the federal courts. While
they have long deferred to Congress and the Executive in setting immigration
policy, the courts have not shied away from providing needed checks and
balances in instances of political branch overreaching. 2 9 Most recently, some
25. See, e.g.. Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Latino Identity, 19 CHICANo-LATINO L.
REV. 197, 201 (1998) (describing support among some Latino/as for Proposition 187) (internal cite
omitted).
26. Peter Katel, Slamming the Door, TIME, Mar. 1I, 2002, at 37 (quoting Mexican deportee
Jose Guzman: "Damn Arabs ... Ever since the towers, it's 'Out of here.').
27. Ethnic, racial, and religious profiling drives a wedge between citizens and noncitizens in
communities of color. For example, rather than challenging anti-immigrant laws, U.S. citizens of
Arab descent might seek to avoid further scrutiny by privileging their citizenship status over their
ethnicity, unintentionally leaving their noncitizen counterparts, many of whom are innocent, subject
to more intense scrutiny. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 14, at 997-98 (describing the case of a woman
who was able to avoid deportation due to her allegedly subversive writings by successfully proving
her U.S. citizenship).
28. As Professor Cole has stated, "What we are willing to do to noncitizens ultimately affects
what we are willing to do to citizens. In the long run, all of our rights are at stake in the war against
terrorism." Cole, supra note 14, at 1003. Relatedly, Professor Kevin Johnson has argued that the
government's adverse policies towards noncitizens of color suggests how they might want to treat
citizens of color, but are prohibited from so doing by the constitution. See Kevin R. Johnson, Race,
the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness,
73 IND. L.J. I I I], 1119-20 (1998); Kevin Johnson, September I/ and Mexican Immigrants:
Collateral Damage Comes Home, DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) ("Although Arab and
Muslim noncitizens felt the brunt of the civil rights deprivations in the immediate aftermath of
September 11, immigrants generally will suffer the long term consequences of the many measures
taken by the federal government in the name of fighting terrorism.").
29. To have true equal protection regarding the impact of immigration laws between U.S.
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courts have curbed Executive zealotry by slowing down the juggernaut, forcing
the Attorney General to follow time-honored due process procedures. First, the
federal Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court chided the FBI for misleading
the courts in seventy-five alleged terrorism cases, all of which involved
noncitizens. 30 Second, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a lower court
decision opening immigration proceedings to the public and press unless the
INS could prove specific threats to national security. 3' It is fitting that in the
second case, Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, the opinion was penned by Sixth
Circuit Judge Damon Keith, an African-American jurist long supportive of civil
rights.32 As Congress and the Executive Branch continue to experiment with
how to prudently and effectively use their immigration power in the war against
terrorism, 33 it will be up to the federal courts to ensure that individual
and non-U.S. citizens is likely impossible because these groups are by definition not similarly
situated for purposes of immigration law. However, outside of immigration law - the law affecting
general civil rights - foreigners and citizens are both groups of autonomous individuals linked
together by the mutual desire to be treated equally under the law. Of course, the problem with the
equal protection claim is that equality may be achieved by eliminating the disadvantages visited
upon the minority group or by increasing the disadvantages suffered by the majority. During the oral
argument of the celebrated death penalty case, McCleskey v. Kemp, Justice O'Connor asked, for
example, whether the disparity in sentencing visited upon killers of black versus white people might
be cured by "execut[ing] more people." EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 203 (1998).
30. See In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 21 F.
Supp. 2d 611 (2002), abrogated, 310 F.3d 717 (2002) (the lower court approved, with conditions,
the Attorney General's request for broader surveillance powers consistent with the Patriot Act, and
the appeals panel removed those conditions). Although the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review reversed the lower court, granting the Attorney General's motion to remove any of
the lower court's conditions on its surveillance requests, the appeals panel did not overturn the lower
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noncitizens are provided sufficient protection in this post-9/1 I world.
The federal courts have at least four good reasons to be skeptical of the
federal political branches, especially during times of real or perceived crisis.
First, while the legitimate goal of immigration law enforcement is deportation,
Ashcroft's true objective in targeting noncitizens appears to be criminal
prosecution for terrorism and subversion. After all, why would the INS risk
letting a terrorist get away-which is what the deportation remedy would be 
34-
rather than prosecuting him with the goal of life imprisonment or the death
penalty? Thus, the constitutional defense of political plenary power is even less
persuasive, especially when, as here, the foreign threat comes not from another
nation (thus justifying the political branches' plenary international relations
power), but instead from a multinational, multiethnic guerilla force that uses
unconventional methods of attack, as it did on 9/11.
Second, we can well expect that Ashcroft will dispatch criminal law
enforcement and immigration agents that might be tempted, at the margin, to
play fast and loose with suspects' civil liberties, as evidenced by the FBI's
deceptive practices in over seventy-five post-9/lI cases. 35 1 do not mean to
suggest bad faith on the agents' part; indeed, I understand that if one believes
that one is restoring "the rule of law to the immigration law,"36 as Assistant
Attorney General Viet Dinh has stated, one's noble ends might justify a liberal
interpretation of otherwise suspect governmental means. Indeed, the recent
decision to split the service and enforcement functions of the INS was prompted
in part by the desire to ensure that civil servants long bent on enforcement do
not end up in the petition processing section looking for ways to deny admission
to family members of lawful permanent residents.37 It is the role of impartial
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courts to ensure that the constitutional equality principle is not unduly
compromised.
Third, history is replete with examples of federal government zealotry, and
the federal courts would do well not to bow to majority sentiment especially
when racial, ethnic, religious, gender, and age stereotypes are reinforced at the
expense of the egalitarian ideal. The legacy of Brown v. Board of Education38
should be that the Supreme Court will never reaffirm Korematsu's39 principles.40
And fourth, controlling political overreaching enhances our standing
abroad. As I mentioned at the very beginning of this piece, domestic
immigration policy and international relations are indeed interrelated, and as
such, if we value human rights at home, our ambassadors abroad will have a
stronger case when they accuse other nations of transgressing civil liberties.
Nicholas Kristof, describing the near month-long detention without charge or
cause of a Yemeni "material witness" married to a U.S. citizen, summarized the
argument thusly: "Imprisoning a Yemeni because he is a Yemeni will not
destroy our freedoms. But it undermines our ability to project our values
abroad."4'
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